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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VRONTIKIS BROS., INC., a corpora-
tion, NICK VRONTIKIS and PETE 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are the subject of a stipulation 
of the parties (R. 5). Defendant does not agree with the 
Statement of Facts set forth in Plaintiffs' brief for the rea-
son that much of it is argumentative. Therefore, Defend-
ant respectfully directs the attention of the Court to the 
Stipulation of Facts, as set forth in the record. 
However, Defendant agrees that it is bound by the 
statutes enacted by the legislature in administering the 
Sales Tax Act, and that the proper method of computing 
sales tax for the purposes of this case is on the basis of 
2% of the consideration paid by the purchaser in cash, 
plus 2% of the fair market value of any articles traded in. 
Consequently, Defendant does not propose to argue the 
matters set forth in Points One and Three of Plaintiff's 
brief. 
STA-TEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE SALES TAX REGULATIONS PROMUL-
GA'TED BY THE TAX COMMISSION ARE NOT INCON-
SISTENT WITH THE SALES TAX ACT. 
2. THE STATE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT ERR 
IN RULING THAT THE PROPER METHOD OF COM-
PUTING SALES TAX IS ON THE BASIS OF "2 PER 
CENT OF THE CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PUR-
CHASER IN CASH, PLUS 2 PER CENT OF THE AL-
LOWANCE FOR THE ARTICLE TRADED IN, REGARD-
LESS OF WHAT EITHER PARTY DEEMS TO BE THE 
ACTUAL WORTH OF' THE ARTICLE TRADED IN." 
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3. THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN ESTABLISH-
ING "FAIR MARKET VALUE" AS THE BASIS OF 
TAXATION OF ARTICLES TAKEN IN EXCHANGE 
INTENDED TO PROTECT BOTH THE STATE AND 
THE TAXPAYER FROM INJUSTICE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE SALES TAX REGULATIONS PROMULGATED 
BY THE STATE TAX COMMISSION ARE NOT INCON-
SISTENT WITH THE SALES TAX ACT. 
Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides 
in part as follows: 
". . . there is levied and there shall be collected and 
paid: 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible 
personal property made within the state of Utah 
equivalent to two per cent of the purchase price 
paid or charged, or in the case of retail sales involv-
ing the exchange of property, equivalent to two per 
cent of the consideration paid or charged, including 
the fair market value of the propertry exchanged at 
the time and place of the exchange ... " (Emphasis 
added.) 
This section of the law was enacted in 1933 (see Laws 
of 1933, Ch. 63, Sec. 4), except that the original enactment 
specified a different rate of taxation. Except for the change 
in the rate, the wording of the above quoted part of Sec-
tion 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 has remained the 
same ever since its enactment. 
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Subsequent to the enactment of Section 59-15-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the State Tax Commission promul-
gated Sales Tax Regulation No. 30, as follows: 
"Purchase Price Defined -The term 'purchase 
price' means the price to the consumer and in-
cludes not only the amount of money paid but also 
the value in money of any property of any kind or 
nature received in exchange." 
Later still, Sales Tax Regulation No. 72, relating spe-
cifically to "Trade-Ins," was promulgated, as follows: 
"Trade-ins-'Retail sale' or 'purchase price' in-
cludes not only cash or money received but also 
the value in money of any property of any kind or 
nature reecived in exchange." 
It is not known when the Commission first promul-
gated these two regulations. However, published copies of 
the Sales Tax Regulations containing the above quoted 
portions in exactly the same form as above show that both 
regulations date back at least as far as November 1, 1937. 
Plaintiffs object to the inclusion in these regulations 
of the words "value in money" as being contrary to the 
legislative intent with respect to the method of valuing 
articles traded-in. Even without reference to the familiar 
rule of statutory construction that an administrative inter-
pretation of statutory words promulgated by regulation 
which is allowed by the legislature to stand without objec-
tion for many years is presumed to announce the legis-
lative intent, it would seem obvious that in order to carry 
out the legislative directive of including within the sales 
tax computation 2 per cent of "the fair market value of the 
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property exchanged" it will be necessary to arrive at some 
value expressed in terms of money. 
The legislature has declared that this value should be 
the "fair market value" of the article traded in, and in the 
case at bar, in keeping with its general practice, the Com~ 
mission decided that the market value of each article 
traded in was the amount agreed upon by the parties to 
the sale as shown on the sales ticket. (R. 6, Para. 12.) The 
fact that this value is expressed in terms of money should 
not be disturbing, since any other expression of value 
would be meaningless. 
In order for the Plaintiffs to prevail, they must show 
that the method chosen by the Commission for arriving at 
the "value in money" is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, 
or inconsistent with the legislative standard. 
In view of the numerous cases cited by Plaintiffs in 
their brief, which demonstrate that the same method of 
valuing trade-ins is used by many other states, it would 
be difficult for them to contend that the decision of the 
Commission is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. 
The only question remaining, then, is whether the 
Commission's determination that the value of the trade-ins 
as agreed by the parties to the sale is the fair market value 
of the article exchanged is inconsistent with the standard 
set by the legislature. Basically this question involves the 
meaning of the term "fair market value" as used in Section 
59-15-4, Utah Code, Annotated, 1953. 
The case of NORTHERN OIL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL 
COM'N, 104 Utah 353, 140 P.2d 329, involved the determin-
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ation of the reasonable cash value to be given to some 
stock under a statute which said: 
"The reasonable cash value or remuneration 
payable in any medium other than cash ... shall 
be esthnated and determined in accordance \vith 
rules prescribed by the [Industrial] Commission." 
(Laws of 1939, Ch. 52, Sec. 19(p).) 
The Commission found the stock to be worth 10 cents 
per share, and in its appeal the plaintiff asserted that its 
stock had no ''market or cash value." The Supreme Court, 
however, found several criteria of value, one of which was 
that, "While it was not bought and sold freely upon the 
open market it was being regularly sold to the public under 
high pressure promotional methods at ten cents per share." 
(NORTHERN OIL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N, supra, 
140 2d at 334.) 
Later the Court in the same opinion stated at 140 P.2d 
334: 
"The company was willing to sell its stock at ten 
cents per share. The highest price a purchaser is 
willing to pay for a commodity, not being under 
compulsion to buy, and the lowest price a seller is 
willing to accept, not being under a compulsion to 
sell, is certainly evidence of its reasonable cash 
value. It is the common method of determining 
'market value.' " (Emphasis added.) 
This is not an isolated definition of the term "market 
value." The Supreme Court of Oregon announced a simi-
lar rule in the case of McCALLISTER v. SAPPINGFIELD, 
72 Ore. 422, 144 Pac. 432, 433, as against the argument of 
one party that the market value was what it would cost to 
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go out in the market and secure another article of the kind 
and quality of the one in question. The court said: 
"The 'market value' of property is the price which 
the property will bring in a fair market, if reason-
able efforts have been made to find a purchaser 
who will give the highest price for it." 
We need only add the concept of a price "in money" 
to the above two interpretations of "market value" in order 
to conform them to the interpretations most often stated 
by the courts of the term "market value." Note, for ex-
ample, the statement of the California Court in the case 
of CITY OF NAP A v. N A VON!, 56 Cal.App.2d, 289, 132 
P.2d 566, 577: 
"But a given piece of land has only one market 
value and not a certain market value for one pur-
pose and a different market value for another pur-
pose. This is true because by what has been termed 
the classic definition, "Market value" is fixed as the 
'highest price estimated in terms of money which 
the land would bring if exposed for sale in the open 
market, with reasonable time allowed in which to 
find a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all the 
uses and purposes to which it was adapted and for 
which it was capable.' " (Emphasis added.) 
The foregoing authorities, when applied to the facts in 
the case at bar would establish that the money value of the 
article traded-in as established by the agreement of the 
parties at the time and place of the sale is the highest 
price which the purchaser (Vrontikis) would pay. It would 
also seem to be the lowest price which the seller (Vron-
tikis' customer) would be willing to accept for the trade-in, 
since it could safely be assumed that anyone who thought 
that the article which they have to trade in had a value 
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which exceeded the advertised trade-in price would not go 
to Plaintiffs' establishment to deal. Furthermore, it does 
not appear that either the Plaintiffs or their customers are 
under any com.pulsion to buy or sell at the time they 
agree on the value of the article traded in. In their brief, 
Plaintiffs attempt to establish as a fact that they are 
under some compulsion to buy (which does not appear in 
the record) by the following statement found on page 16 of 
their brief: 
"This fixed allowance cannot, under the defin~tions 
of 'fair market value,' be said to be the item's fair 
market value, as the purchaser (Vrontikis) of the 
item cannot reject, but is compelled bry its own ad-
vertising, to accept the item as a trade-in at the 
agreed price." (Emphasis added) 
If this is an attempt to establish some compulsion 
upon Plaintiffs by way of contract, it is contrary to the 
established rules of law, for it is well recognized that prices 
quoted in advertising are invitations to deal, and not con-
tractual offers, particularly where by its terms the adver-
tisement indicates that the value to be given for the article 
traded in is conditioned upon the purchase of some other 
article from Plaintiffs. See Corbin on Contracts, Vol. I, 
Sec. 25; A. L. I., Restatement of Contracts, Vol. I, Sec. 25. 
In view of the foregoing authorities, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Commission was amply justified in de-
termining that the value in money ascribed to the trade-in 
by the parties to the sale was the fair market value of the 
article being traded in. 
POINT II 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
RULING THAT THE PROPER METHOD OF COMPUT-
10 
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ING SALES TAX IS ON THE BASIS OF "2 PER CENT 
OF THE CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER 
IN, CASH, PLUS 2 PER CENT OF THE ALLOWANCE 
FOR THE ARTICLE TRADED IN, REGARDLESS OF 
WHAT EITHER PARTY DEEMS TO BE THE ACTUAL 
WORTH OF THE ARTICLE TRADED IN." 
Earlier in this brief Defendant agreed with the state-
ment contained in Plaintiff's brief as Point Three that the 
proper manner of computing sales tax is on the basis of 2 
per cent of the consideration paid in cash plus 2 per cent 
of the fair lnat·ket value of the article traded in. Defend-
ant agrees with this formula for the reason that such is 
the wording in the law. However, Defendant asserts that 
there is no basis here for finding that the term "fair market 
value" means anything other than the allowance given for 
the article traded in. 
Plaintiffs have quoted language from the case of 
HAWLEY v. JQ_HNSON, 58 Cal.App.2d 232, 136 P.2d 638, 
which might seem to indicate a difference between "fair 
market value" and so-called "agreed value." The Court 
stated: 
"It is to be observed that our statute expressly ex-
cludes cash discounts from the tax, but imposes the 
tax on payments in property 'valued in money.' 
The parties by bona fide agreement having valued 
the property in money, under the express terms of 
the statute have fixed the measure of the tax. To 
make market value rather than agreed value the 
measure would create almost insuperable adminis-
trative difficulties, since the taxing power would 
be compelled in every transaction to look behind 
the agreed value and ascertain the actual market 
value of the property traded in. In the give and 
take of the market place the value arrived at by the 
11 
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free negotiation of the parties :may safely be relied 
upon to furnish a reasonable measure of the value 
in money of property traded in." 
However, this quoted extract is the only place where the 
court mentions "market value" (except that in restating 
plaintiff's argun1ent the court indicates that the plaintiff 
equated the terms "market value" and "appraised value"). 
This certainly does not amount to a holding that there is a 
difference between market value and agreed value. It is 
respectfully submitted that the court actually held only 
that the term "gross receipts" as found in the California 
statute included the agreed value of articles traded in, re-
gardless of what their market value might be. The use of 
market or any other value as the standard would not create 
any administrative problem, once that value were estab-
lished. The "insuperable administrative difficulties" 
spoken of by the court would arise from requiring the 
Commission to disregard the value put on the article by the 
"bona fide agreement of the parties" and independently 
thereof to establish some value for each article traded in to 
very retailer throughout the state. 
The solution proposed by the plaintiffs on page 5 of 
their brief wherein they assert that the retailers of the 
state should be charged 2 per cent of the amount for which 
they subsequently sell articles taken in by them as trade-
ins has two principal defects. First, the Utah Sales Tax is 
a consumer's tax, and the State Tax Commission has no 
right to impose the obligation to pay any part of the tax 
upon the retailers of the state. The second principal defect 
relates to the subsequent disposition of the trade-in by the 
retailer. From the stipulation of facts on file herein it ap-
pears that Plaintiffs could not accurately account for the 
sales tax on all articles which would be due under such a 
12 
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scheme. Plaintiffs admit that "in many instances [they] 
did and do not require the purchaser to surrender the item 
being traded in nor did or do the petitioners, in all in-
stances, pick up the item traded in." (R. 5, Para. 7) Under 
Plaintiffs' asserted method the state would receive no sales 
tax upon such articles, although there is no showing that 
such articles do not have some n1arket value. 
Plaintiffs have further stipulated that they donate "large 
quantities" or articles traded in to charitable organizations. 
(R. 6, Para. 8) In their brief, Plaintiffs have assumed that 
these articles had no market value. This assumption is 
not supported in the record. In fact, from the record it 
clearly appears that due to the limitations of storage space 
available for trade-ins and because of their volume of busi-
ness and not because of any lack of market value, it was 
their practice to donate to charitable institutions all trade-
in merchandise which they could not resell within 30 days. 
(R. 6, Para. 10) Under the method asserted by Plaintiffs 
the state would receive no tax upon such articles, although 
there is no showing that they did not have any market 
value at the time they were traded in to Plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, not all retailers of the state follow Plain-
tiffs' practice of selling or otherwise disposing of articles 
traded in within 30 days. And it is submitted that even 
Plaintiffs' 30-day limitation for sales of trade-ins does not 
satisfy the requirement of Sec. 59-15-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953 that the tax be paid upon two per cent of the 
consideration paid "including the fair market value of the 
property exchanged at the time and place of the exchange." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In view of the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs actually 
13 
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did allow the amounts shown on the audit deficiencies as 
the value of merchandise traded in, it is difficult to under-
stand how they can now claim a refund solely upon their 
assertion, which is unsupported by anything in the record, 
that the articles which they took as trade-ins were actually 
worth some other value. 
POINT THREE 
THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN ESTABLISHING 
"FAIR MARKET VALUE" AS THE BASIS OF TAXA-
TION OF ARTICLES TAKEN IN EXCHANGE INTEND-
ED TO PROTECT BOTH THE STATE AND THE TAX-
PAYER FROM INJUSTICE. 
The above wording was taken substantially from 
Plaintiffs' brief because Defendant agrees that such was 
obviously the legislative intent. Defendant attempted to 
show under point two herein that the method of computing 
sales tax asserted by Plaintiffs would not be fair to the 
state, the retailers, or to the taxpayers if adopted. 
Plaintiffs infer in their brief that "if the shoe were on 
the other foot" and if Plaintiffs were in a position to give 
less than fair market value for articles traded in the Com-
mission would try to look behind the value fixed by the 
Plaintiffs. It should be noted that if the Plaintiffs prevail 
in this appeal, the Commission will be forced to do exactly 
that. 
Plaintiffs find some comfort for their assertion in the 
case of HOWARD PORE, INC., v. STATE COMMISSION-
ER OF REVENUE, 322 Mich. 49, 33 N.W.2d 657, 4 ALR 
2d 1041. In that case the Michigan Commissioner of Rev-
14 
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enue issued regulations to the effect that "market value" 
would be used as the basis of valuation for the article 
traded in. However, the deci.sion clearly stated as a fact 
that general economic conditions prevailing at the time 
compelled purchasers of new automobiles to buy on terms 
dictated by the retailers, and that it was the general prac-
tice of all retailers systematically to undervalue the cars 
being traded in. Under the circumstances and in order to 
reach the unreported consideration which otherwise 
would have evaded taxation the Commissioner of Revenue 
devised a method designed to force the retailers to ascribe 
a realistic value to the trade-ins for sales tax purposes. 
Should a similar condition prevail in Utah so that the 
market would no longer be "free and uncontrolled" and the 
purchasers would be at the .mercy of the retailers, then 
the Utah State Tax Commission might similarly be forced 
to disregard the values agreed upon by the parties if the 
Commission could devise some reasonble system for estab-
lishing the value which should be ascribed to the trade-in. 
This should not startle Plaintiffs, since even they define 
market value as being what a willing buyer would give to 
a willing seller, where neither is under any compulsion to 
deal. 
However, so long as the market remains free and un-
controlled by either buyer or seller the Commossion, in the 
interest of economic administration of the tax laws does 
not propose to use any value, other than that chosen by 
the parties. This protects all parties from injustice, since 
such value was determined by the parties themselves in 
a bona fide, arms-length transaction into which neither is 
forced to enter. 
15 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Defendant respectfully sub-
mits that the findings of the Commission should be sus-
tained, and the Plaintiffs' request for a refund of sales tax 
should be denied. 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General, 
JOHN G. MARSHALL, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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